Introduction
In ordinary nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (QM), the observables pertaining to a system typically form the self-adjoint part of the algebra B(H) of bounded operators acting on a Hilbert space H. 1 B(H) is an algebra of the genus von Neumann and the species Type I factor. 2 Here we consider quantum systems whose observable-algebras belong to the same genus, but correspond to more exotic species. Settings in which the exotic species occur include relativistic quantum field theory (QFT) and the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics (QSM), reached by letting the number of systems one considers and the volume they occupy go to infinity while keeping their density finite. The aim of this essay is to articulate the impact the non-Type-I von Neumann algebras have on the interpretation of quantum probability.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 sets the stage for the rest of our discussion by highlighting key elements of the formalism and interpretation of quantum probability in the familiar setting of Type-I von Neumann algebras. Key elements of the formalism include Gleason's Theorem and Lüders' Rule of Conditionalization; key elements of its standard interpretation include the use of minimal projection operators to characterize not only the preparation of quantum states but also the results of quantum measurements, as well as the manner in which the former assign probabilities to the latter. Section 3 motivates the significance of non-Type-I algebras by describing some physical situations that give rise to them. It also reviews some of the novel features of these algebras, including features that might seem to be impediments to interpreting quantum probability in the general setting. Section 4 examines this appearance. It allays the worry that key components of the formalism of quantum probabilities familiar from ordinary QM are artifacts of features peculiar to Type-I factor von Neumann algebras. In particular, it is shown how to generalize Gleason's Theorem and Lüders' Rule of Conditionalization to von Neumann algebras of arbitrary type. Section 5 identifies some reasons to think that interpretations of quantum probabilities familiar from ordinary QM do not extend, without significant adaptation, to more general settings, and discusses some possible escapes from the difficulties engendered by non-Type-I algebras. Conclusions are presented in Sec. 6. The appendices review the basics of operator algebras, the classification of von Neumann algebras, and lattice theory.
This introductory section closes with a brief sketch of some of the difficulties encountered with non-Type-I algebras. Many familiar interpretations of ordinary QM exploit a feature of B(H) that an arbitrary von Neumann algebra M may not necessarily share. B(H) has atoms, which are minimal projection operators. (Intuitively, a projection operator E is minimal in a von Neumann algebra M if M contains no nontrivial projection whose range is a proper subspace of E's range; see App. B for details.) A tactic widespread in the interpretation of ordinary QM is to use atoms in B(H) to interpret quantum probabilities. In the orthodox collapse interpretation, atoms code the endpoints of a measurement collapse. Atoms code the determinate 'value states' recognized by modal interpretations and the 'relative states' purveyed by many-worlds interpretations. In these interpretations, atoms characterize the situations that are assigned probabilities by a density-operator state W on B(H), as well as explain why the Born Rule accurately predicts the values of those probabilities. For example, supposing W to be nondegenerate, a stock modal interpretation puts possible value states of a system described by W in one-to-one correspondence with the projection operators furnishing W's spectral resolution, which are atoms. The modal interpretation explicates the Born Rule by setting the probability that the system occupies the value state coded by the atom E equal to Tr(WE).
We do not contend that in the Type-I case the interpretation of quantum probability must be mediated by atoms-only that it typically is. Part of the point of considering more general cases is to determine whether what is typical is nevertheless dispensable-to determine, that is, whether and how the interpretation of quantum probability might proceed in the absence of features to which interpreters habitually appeal. Section 5 will suggest that although there are candidates formally well qualified as atoms to play a role in the interpretation of probabilities assigned by states on a von Neumann algebra M that does not contain atoms, they lack the metaphysical and practical qualifications atoms enjoy. In the presence of exotic von Neumann algebras, quantum probability theory is a formalism still in search of an interpretation. 3 2 Ordinary QM: Formalism and interpretation
Formalism: Gleason's Theorem and Lüders' Rule
Much of our discussion will focus on normal states on a von Neumann algebra M acting on a Hilbert space H. These are the states that are generated by density operators (positive trace class operators) on H; that is, ω is a normal state for M just in case there is a density operator W such that ω(A) := Tr(WA) for all A ∈ M. There are good mathematical reasons for focusing on such states; for example, countable additivity is a mathematically desirable feature, and this feature obtains for all and only the normal states. 4 But physical considerations also motivate the desire for normality. There is a folklore in the physics literature to the effect that states that are not normal with respect to local observablealgebras (e.g. algebras associated with double-diamond regions in Minkowski space-time) are not physically realizable in QFT because an infinite energy would be required to prepare them. Segal (1959) suggested another reason to restrict attention to normal states. Physics aims to articulate physical laws, which we might understand as interrelations between physical magnitudes, or their values, that every physical state instantiates. Having identified a von Neumann algebra M as the algebra of physical magnitudes, this understanding of physical law underwrites a characterization of physical states: the physical states on M are those that respect the law-like relationships between magnitudes in M. Some magnitudes in M are limits in the weak operator topology of sequences of other magnitudes in M. Let A i be a sequence of elements of M. A state ω on M is weakly continuous only if it follows from the fact that an element A of M is a limit in the weak operator topology of a sequence A i of elements of M that lim i→∞ ω(A i ) = ω(A). A state ω which is not weakly continuous can assign the weak limit of a sequence of elements of M a value that is not determined by the values ω assigns members of the sequence. This could hinder ω from instantiating laws whose expression requires the taking of a weak limit. Arguably, the integral form of Schrödinger's Equation is such a law. The one-parameter group of unitarities U(t) implementing the time evolution of a quantum system has a self-adjoint infinitesimal generator-the observable that Schrödinger identifies as the Hamiltonian H of a system-only if U(t+ δ) converges in the weak operator topology to U(t) as δ → 0. In this case, H's spectral projections are strong (and therefore weak) operator limits of polynomials p i of U(t) (see Prugovečki 1981, pp. 335-9) . A state ω that fails to be weakly continuous can assign H an expectation value different from the limit of the expectation values it assigns the polynomials p i . Such an expectation value assignment fails to respect the functional and limiting relationships Schrödinger's Law posits between the family of evolution operators U(t) and a Hamiltonian generator of that family. In this sense, a state that fails to be weakly continuous can fail to instantiate Schrödinger's Law of time development.
In general, states that fail to be weakly continuous threaten to upset nomic relations M makes available. To avert this threat, one might reject as unphysical states on M that fail to be weakly continuous. This rules out non-normal states because non-normal states are not weakly continuous (see Bratteli & Robinson 1987, Thm 2.4.21, p. 76 , and the definitions that precede it). Together these considerations help to explain why non-normal states are often referred to in the literature as 'singular' states.
Since the present concern is with ordinary QM, specialize for the moment to the case of M = B(H) with H separable, and let P B(H) be the projection lattice of B(H). 5 Obviously a normal state on B(H) defines a countably additive measure on P B(H) . The converse is the assertion that for any countably additive measure μ : P B(H) → [0, 1] there is a unique normal state ω on B(H) such that ω(E) = μ(E) for all E ∈ P B(H) (or, equivalently, there is a density operator W such that Tr(WE) = μ(E) for all E ∈ P(B(H))). This assertion is not true in all generality; in particular, it fails if dim(H) ≤ 2. But a highly nontrivial result, known as Gleason's Theorem, shows that the assertion is true for dim(H) > 2. 6 Another (relatively shallow but) important result provides the motivation for Lüders' Rule. Let μ : P B(H) → [0, 1] be a countably additive measure. By Gleason's Theorem, if dim(H) > 2 there is a unique normal state ω on B(H) that extends μ to B(H).
is a normal state. This state has the following property:
5 See App. C for lattices. 6 In the philosophy literature, Gleason's Theorem is often stated as a result about probability measures on the lattice of closed subspaces of H. There is a natural isomorphism of this lattice and P B(H) .
where ≤ is the relation of subspace inclusion. Furthermore, ω E is the unique normal state with the property (L) (see Bub 1977) . Using the trace prescription, the state ω E can be rewritten as
where W is the density operator corresponding to the normal state ω. These properties of ω E are taken to motivate its interpretation as giving a conditional quantum probability. This rule for quantum conditionalization is commonly referred to as 'Lüders' Rule' (see Bub 1977 and Hughes 1989, Sec. 8.2 ). In the above form, it might be used to assign statistics to experiments subsequent to selective measurements, that is, measurements after which the experimenter retains only outcomes corresponding to the condition E. A form of Lüders' Rule applicable to nonselective measurements will be discussed in Sec. 4.
Allied with Lüders' Rule is the important notion of a filter, which we will state for von Neumann algebras in general. Intuitively, a filter for a state ϕ is a projection operator E ϕ such that Lüders-conditionalizing an arbitrary state ω on that projection operator yields a state ω E ϕ identical to ϕ, provided ϕ and ω aren't 'orthogonal' to begin with. (If the proviso fails, there's no way to Lüders-conditionalize ω to obtain ϕ.) Officially, a filter is defined as follows. Let ϕ be a normal state on a von Neumann algebra M and let S ϕ be its support projection. (The support projection or carrier of a state ϕ on a von Neumann algebra M is the smallest projection in M to which ϕ assigns a probability of 1. If it exists, the support projection is unique.) The projection E ϕ ∈ M is a filter for ϕ just in case, for any normal state ω on M, if ω(S ϕ ) = 0 then 7
ω E ϕ (A) should be recognizable both as the state ω Lüders-conditionalized on a Yes outcome of an E ϕ -measurement, and as the post-measurement state of a system initially in ω and subject to such a measurement, according to the Projection Postulate. In this interpretation-dependent sense, we can directly observe and prepare ϕ.
The following fact, whose proof is sketched at the end of this section, will be important in what follows:
Fact 1 (Purification) A normal state ϕ on a von Neumann algebra M has a filter if and only if it is pure.
In the case of ordinary QM, i.e. M = B(H), the normal pure states coincide with the vector states (see App. A), and all of these states have filters. For Type-III algebras, which will feature in what follows, the normal states also coincide with the vector states; but there are no normal pure states and, hence, no normal state on such an algebra has a filter. This raises concerns about preparation procedures which will be addressed in due course.
Proof Pure ⇒ filter: if ϕ is a normal pure state on M then its support projection S ϕ is a filter for ϕ.
Since the normal state ϕ is pure, its support projection S ϕ is an atom (cf. p. 264) of M. 8 Therefore, S ϕ MS ϕ consists of scalar multiples of S ϕ (Kadison & Ringrose 1997b, Prop. 6.4 
If ω is normal and if ω(S ϕ ) = 0, then Lüders-conditionalizing ω on S ϕ yields a state ω S ϕ whose action on M will coincide with ϕ's:
This establishes that S ϕ satisfies the definition of a filter E ϕ for ϕ.
Filter ⇒ pure: if ϕ is a mixed (nonpure) normal state on M then it has no filter. Suppose for reductio that ϕ has a filter E ϕ . Let S ϕ be ϕ's support projection. If ω is a normal state such that ω(S ϕ ) = 0, then (according to the definition of a filter) ϕ (E ϕ 
But the r. h. s. is less than 1, because S ϕ is the smallest projection ϕ maps to 1 and F < S ϕ . We have our contradiction and can conclude that no mixed normal state has a filter. 2
Interpreting probabilities in ordinary QM
With the mention of the Projection Postulate, we have strayed into the territory of interpretation. We can resolve the question of the interpretation of quantum probability into two parts. First, how do quantum systems come to occupy conditions-call them quantum states-that assign specifiable (and ergo testable) probabilities? Second, how ought one to understand the probabilities these quantum states assign? These parts overlap with the traditional problems of preparation and measurement. As befits its larger profile, the latter contains a set of questions, some of which we've already alluded to. (Q1) What are the recipients of quantum probability assignments? Put another way, this is recognizably the central question of quantum interpretation: what configurations are possible for a system in a quantum state, and what value-attributing propositions determinately true or false of it? We will call this the problem of characterization. (Q2) Why is the Born Rule an empirically adequate predictor of the values of these probabilities? We will call this the problem of explication. (Q3) What is the nature-epistemic, non-epistemic, decision-theoretic, or what have you-of these probabilities? We won't give this problem a special name, because it arises whenever a physical theory assigns probabilities, but we will note that it would be elegant if quantum probabilities could be brought to heel by existing strategies for the interpretation of probability. In this essay, we don't take a stand on how to answer (Q3). (Fortunately, other contributors to this volume are less pusillanimous.) We do try to delineate complications that QFT and the thermodynamic limit of QSM present for standard strategies for interpreting the probabilities of ordinary QM.
By examining the account of quantum probabilities urged on students of quantum mechanics by their textbooks, we can see how elements of the quantum probability formalism circumscribe and facilitate the interpretation of quantum probabilities. The crux of the textbook account is the putative phenomenon of measurement collapse, in which the measurement of an observable A (assumed to have a purely discrete spectrum) on an object in the superposition |ψ = ∑ i c i |α i of A-eigenstates |α i collapses that superposition to one of those eigenstates, with |c n | 2 giving the probability of a collapse to the eigenstate |α n . The outcome of a measurement suffering such a collapse is the A-eigenvalue associated with |α n . In the parlance of the previous section, the A-eigenprojection E A n whose range is the subspace spanned by |α n is a filter for |α n . This enables a general statement of the textbook account of state preparation: a measurement of the filter E ϕ yielding the outcome Yes prepares a quantum system in the state ϕ. By Fact 1, a state ϕ susceptible to such preparation is a pure (= vector) state on B(H). This textbook account of state preparation not only covers the preparation of quantum systems in known states, when those states possess filters, but also justifies calculating probabilities of measurement outcomes subsequent to such preparation using Lüders' Rule.
When the prepared state |α n is subject to a B-measurement, the textbook account again invokes measurement collapse. Assume that B is nondegenerate. (This assumption isn't essential to the orthodox account, but it streamlines its presentation. We will lift it presently.) Expressed as a superposition of B-eigenstates, |α n = ∑ i d i |β i . Recipients of quantum probabilities assigned by |α n are the possible outcomes of the B-measurement, each of which is coded by a unique B-eigenstate, associated with an atom E B i in the projection lattice of B(H). What's true of the outcome coded by |β i is determined by applying the eigenvector-eigenvalue link to |β i . Thus the orthodox account solves the characterization problem. It solves the explication problem by assigning the standard Born Rule probability (|d i | 2 ) to a collapse to the outcome coded by |β i .
Lüders' Rule characterizes the state prepared by measuring a filter, the state whose assignment of quantum probabilities the orthodox account characterizes and explicates. Lüders' Rule supposes the system to occupy a normal state prior to the filter measurement. The pre-preparation states amenable to the textbook account are exactly those characterized by Gleason's Theorem.
But since the textbook account and the Projection Postulate generate wellknown difficulties it would be desirable to have a collapse-free reading of quantum probabilities. Here is one such reading. 9 Start with the question of how quantum systems come to occupy states that assign specifiable probabilities. If ω is the pre-measurement state and a measurement of the projection E returns a Yes answer, then the Projection Postulate asserts that the Lüders-conditionalized state ω E is the post-measurement state. The no-collapse reading denies this. On that reading, ω E is not literally the post-measurement state, wrenched from ω by the agency of measurement collapse. Schrödinger evolution is exceptionless. Nevertheless, ω E summarizes a set of probabilities conditional on E implicit in ω. Because measurements subsequent to the E-measurement occur in the scope of the condition, ω E is the appropriate predictive instrumentality to use when considering those measurements-appropriate because Lüders' Rule is the correct expression for quantum conditional probabilities, not because collapse has occurred. So the strategy of the Projection Postulate-free reading is to relieve ourselves of measurement collapse by taking the Lüders Rule to be basic, a move motivated by the capacity of Lüders' Rule, taken as basic, to save the very phenomena the Projection Postulate was taken to explain. 10 As for a collapse-free account of the probabilities assigned by a normal state corresponding to a density operator W on B(H), the options are legion. Faced with the measurement problem-the problem that Schrödinger's cat winds up, like a radioactive atom but unlike any feline every encountered on earth, superposed between life and death-collapse interpretations court the miraculous by interrupting Schrödinger's Law-governed unitary dynamics by measurement collapse. The family of modal interpretations is united by the conviction that the solution to the measurement problem consists not in novel dynamics, but in 9 For a development, see van Fraassen 1991. 10 Ruetsche (2003) extends the strategy to a Projection Postulate-free account of preparation. novel ways of conceptualizing superposition. Thus they seek to understand the cat's superposed state as consistent with its being determinately alive or determinately dead. We will focus on a modal interpretation according to which each projection in W's spectral resolution codes a value state of a system described by a density-operator state W, with the eigenvector-eigenvalue link providing the decoder. This is the modal solution of the characterization problem. The modal interpretation solves the explication problem with the help of some additional assumptions. Let W describe the reduced state of an apparatus after a measurement that perfectly correlates the eigenstates |p i of the pointer observable P with eigenstates |o i of the object observable being measured, and let the pre-measurement state of the object system be
i . According to the modal interpretation, the probability that the apparatus enjoys the value state coded by E P n is |c n | 2 , which is exactly the Born Rule probability the pre-measurement object state assigns the n th outcome. Other no-collapse interpretations can be shoe-horned, with more or less force, into the modal mold (see Sec. 5.2.3). Notice how Gleason's Theorem underwrites the generality of the modal interpretation: geared to the interpretation of probabilities assigned by density-operator states, the modal interpretation is therefore geared to the interpretation of any normal state on any B(H), provided dim(H) > 2.
What happens to the modal interpretation if W is degenerate? There is disagreement. One option is to allot W as many distinct value states as it has distinct eigenvalues, with each value state coded by a (possibly nonatomic) eigenprojection. In the limiting case that W is a tracial state (e. g. proportional to the identity operator on H; this can occur only when H is finite-dimensional), this option has the consequence that the only propositions true of a system in state W are those attributing values to multiples of the identity operator-a highly uninformative solution to the characterization problem. In this case, the modal explication of Born Rule probabilities is similarly banal: the only probabilities explicated are certainties assigned to tautologies. Another option, more informative but potentially less principled, is to pick from among degenerate W's myriad eigenbases a privileged one, corresponding to a complete set of orthogonal atoms, and to use these to characterize value states and explicate Born Rule probabilities. Similar points apply to the collapse interpretation when the measured observable A is degenerate. Let E A n be an A-eigenprojection associated with a degenerate eigenvalue. The Projection Postulate asserts a system in the state ω and subject to an A-measurement yielding this eigenvalue to occupy the state ω E A n , a mixed state. One might suspect that there are more truths to be had about such a system than can be obtained by applying the eigenvector-eigenvalue link to ω E A n . The Maximal-Beable Approach, detailed in Sec. 5, gives voice to this suspicion.
This cursory discussion suggests that prevailing practices of probability interpretation in ordinary QM take the set of states assigning quantum probabilities to be the set described by Gleason's Theorem, implicate Lüders' Rule (either as a presupposition, as in no-collapse approaches, or a consequence, as in collapse approaches) in the account of how probability-assigning states are prepared, and use atoms in B(H) to characterize the recipients of quantum probabilities as well as to explicate their obedience to the Born Rule.
3 Non-Type-I algebras
Relevance to physics of non-Type-I algebras
Von Neumann algebras not isomorphic to B(H) for some separable H are not artefacts of a mathematical excess. Indeed, they are typical of quantum theories of systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom. Here are some examples.
In 
(M).
Typically the physically relevant representation is taken to be the Gelfand-Neimark-Segal (GNS for short) representation picked out by some distinguished state, e.g. the vacuum state. For the Minkowski vacuum state for the mass m ≥ 0 Klein-Gordon field, if O is a region with non-empty space-like complement, the standard axioms for algebraic QFT imply that M(O) is a Type-III factor (Araki 1964); and results by Buchholz et al. (1987) indicate that the Type-III character of local algebras holds not only for free scalar fields but quite generically for quantum fields of physical interest. 12 By contrast, the global von Neumann algebra will be Type I if the representation satisfies the Spectrum Condition (the energy-momentum operator has a spectrum confined to the future light cone) and contains a vacuum state (a cyclic vector invariant under space-time translations), or even if there is no vacuum state but there is a 'mass gap.' However, there are massless theories of both bosons and fermions with no mass gap and no vacuum state in which the global von Neumann algebra satisfies a positive-energy condition but is Type II or Type III (see Doplicher et al. 1984 , Buchholz & Doplicher 1984 , and Borek 1985 .
Non-Type-I algebras are also commonplace for QSM in the thermodynamic limit, where the number of constituents of the system and its volume tend to infinity while the density remains finite. In this limit the so-called KuboMartin-Schwinger (KMS) condition explicates the notion of equilibrium (for a brief exposition, see Sewell 1986, pp. 49-51) . KMS states at finite temperatures in the thermodynamic limit of QSM correspond to Type-III factors for a wide variety of physically interesting systems: Bose and Fermi gases, the Einstein crystal, the BCS model (see Emch 1972, pp. 139-40; Bratteli & Robinson 1997, Cor. 5.3.36 We will be concerned here mainly with Type-III algebras, but many of the remarks below apply also to Type-II algebras. 13 
Novel features of Type-III algebras
We list here some features of Type-III algebras that may be unfamiliar to philosophers who work on foundations of ordinary QM and, thus, are used to the properties of Type-I algebras. As App. B elaborates, a defining feature of Type-III factor von Neumann algebras is that all their nontrivial projection operators are infinite. Roughly, the projection E ∈ M is infinite if there is some nonzero projection F in M such that F's range is a proper subspace of E's range and isometrically embeddable into E's range. It follows that Type-III factor algebras lack atoms. In general, (i) Type-III algebras contain no atoms or minimal projectors.
(ii) Type-III algebras do not admit normal pure states. Any von Neumann algebra-or, for that matter, any C * -algebra-admits pure states. Features (i)-(iv) also obtain for Type-II algebras. Feature (i) and its consequences hold for some Type-I non-factor algebras as well; 14 a concrete example will be given in Sec. 5. But in physics typical examples of atomless algebras concern Type-II or Type-III algebras. Atomless Type-I non-factor algebras arise in making interpretational moves, such as understanding the nature of continuous quantum magnitudes (see Halvorson 2004) or in implementing the maximalabelian strategy discussed below for interpreting quantum probabilities.
The features listed above unmoor a number of fixed points on the conventional (that is, Type-I factor) quantum interpretation horizon. The interpreter accustomed to that horizon may be forgiven for experiencing vertigo. The next section offers a remedy in the form of fixed points on that horizon that remain in the general setting.
When M is not Type I: Probability formalism
Does an analogue of Gleason's Theorem hold for von Neumann algebras not isomorphic to B(H)? The answer is positive, but nearly twenty years of work were needed to work out all the details. (Maeda 1989; Hamhalter 2003, Ch. 5 In the case where μ : P (M) → [0, 1] is only finitely additive, the result is that there is a unique singular state ω on M such that ω(E) = μ(E) for all E ∈ P(M).
Generalized Gleason's Theorem
Next we note that the motivation for Lüders' Rule, originally formulated for the case of ordinary quantum mechanics with M = B(H) (cf. Sec. 2), carries over to all von Neumann algebras for which the generalized Gleason Theorem applies. That is, the Lüders-conditionalized state ω E is the unique normal state satisfying the property (L) of Sec. 2.1. 16 To the extent that this motivation is persuasive for ordinary QM and Type-I algebras, it is also persuasive for other von Neumann algebras.
The discussion of Sec. 2 confined its attention to Lüders' Rule for a selective measurement. Here we will note a difficulty with applying Lüders' Rule for nonselective measurements to observable-algebras that are not Type I n for n finite. Consider a nonselective measurement of O. In the case (a) that O has a pure discrete spectrum, let {E i } be O's spectral projectors. Then, given a pre-measurement state ω on a von Neumann algebra M and a nonselective measurement of O, the obvious way to define the post-measurement state is by a natural generalization of Lüders' Rule: A von Neumann algebra is of Type I n if the unit element can be written as the sum of n abelian projectors. When H is nonseparable the result continues to hold if countable additivity is replaced by complete additivity.
16 Proof Let ϕ be a normal state on a von Neumann algebra M with said property. Consider an arbitrary G ∈ P(M). In sum, the fact that in QFT and QSM one has to deal with non-Type-I von Neumann algebras does not mean that the formalism of quantum probabilities developed in ordinary QM for Type-I algebras has to be abandoned or significantly modified.
When M is not Type I: Probability interpretation

Preparation
Part of the task of interpreting quantum probability is making sense of our capacity to bring quantum systems into conditions we can understand as assigning probabilities. This task is entangled with the problem of quantum state preparation. In the Type-I case, interpretations typically account for our capacity to prepare a quantum state ϕ by appeal to Lüders' Rule (or the Projection Postulate) and the presence in B(H) of a filter E ϕ for ϕ. Although Lüders' Rule extends to the Type-III case, the availability of filters does not. Fact 1 along with Novel Feature (ii) are to blame: the only normal states on a von Neumann algebra admitting filters are pure ones, and a Type-III algebra M has no normal pure states. This renders the account of preparation by filtration bankrupt.
Local relativistic QFT may have a way to compensate for the lack of filters for normal states of Type-III algebras. As noted in Sec. 3, the local algebra M(O) associated with an open bounded region O of space-time is generically Type III. Therefore, any normal state on M(O) is a mixed state which does not have a filter in M(O). Thus, there can be no local preparation procedure for a normal state on M(O) that consists in measuring a filter in M(O). Fortunately, however, the standard axioms for local relativistic QFT imply that the funnel property holds for suitable space-time regions in certain models. 18 The funnel property entails that any normal state on M(O) does have a filter in some M O where O ⊃ O, guaranteeing that some local preparation procedure is possible, albeit in an expanded sense of 'local' (see Buchholz et al. 1987) .
Whether it is desirable to thus expand our sense of 'local' is perhaps a matter for debate. But it is clear that the QFT stratagem for securing preparation by filtration cannot be adapted to the setting of the thermodynamic limit of QSM. What one would like to be able to prepare is a state of a superconductor or a ferromagnet, that is, a state of the entire quasi-local algebra itself. That algebra will typically be Type III, and no funnel property can be invoked to embed it in a Type-I algebra. We see no prospect of a filtration-based account of the preparation of normal states in the case of QSM. Nor does it appear promising to aim instead at an account of the preparation of singular (non-normal) states. For one thing, the aim of preparation is to bring a system into a state from which we can extract probabilistic predictions that enable us to make sense of the natural world. Insofar as the probabilities assigned by singular states lack coherence of countable additivity and may also, Sec. 2.1 suggested, lack the coherence of instantiating natural laws, accounting for the preparation of singular states is a Pyrrhic victory. For another thing, the account of preparation by filtration may not extend intact to singular states. The very notion of a filter supposes that the state of a system prior to a filtration-interaction is normal. Once singular states are countenanced, this supposition is unmotivated.
In sum, there are reasons to doubt that strategies for making sense of state preparation in the Type-I case will succeed in a general setting. But let us bracket these doubts for now. Let us turn to the question of how to understand the probabilities assigned by a state ω on a Type-III von Neumann algebra M.
Interpretation of probabilities
We will work with a template for the interpretation of quantum probability which, we contend, continues to apply even to atomless von Neumann algebras. We call the template the Maximal-Beable Approach (MBA). The nomenclature is due to John Bell, who envisioned a future theory that is more satisfactory than the present quantum theory in that it does not appeal to the unanalysed concept of measurement:
Such a theory would not be fundamentally about 'measurement', for that would again imply incompleteness of the system and unanalyzed interventions from outside. Rather it should again become possible to say of that system not that such and such may be observed to be so but that such and such be so. The theory would not be about observables but about 'beables'. (Bell 1987c, p. 41) Attempts have been made to understand the present quantum theory in terms of beables. There are two ways to unpack this notion, both of which can be construed as ways to get at the idea that, relative to a state ϕ on a von Neumann algebra of observables M, a subalgebra R ⊆ M consists of beables if its elements can be assigned simultaneously definite values, the probabilities of which are defined by ϕ. Both approaches lead to abelian subalgebras of the von Neumann algebra of interest.
Classical probability models
The first approach to identifying beable subalgebras starts with C * -algebras before specializing to von Neumann algebras. The idea is that the C * -algebra A counts as a beable algebra for the state ϕ if the pair ϕ, A admits a classical probability model. For an abelian algebra such a model consists of a probability space (Λ, μ ϕ ) with Λ dμ ϕ = 1 and an association A Z −→Ẑ, whereẐ is a measurable complex-valued function on Λ, such that
Condition (C1) says that the elements of A can be interpreted as random variables on a common probability space and the expectation values assigned by ϕ can be interpreted as weighted averages of the random variables. Condition (C2) requires that the association Z −→Ẑ preserves the structure of the algebra. (C2) has been labeled a noncontextuality assumption as well as a causality assumption. The latter designation seems to us dubious, but we will not press the point here. Any abelian C * -algebra containing the identity, and, a fortiori, any abelian von Neumann algebra, admits a classical probability model for any state. 
Theorem 1. (Gelfand) Let A be a unital abelian C * -algebra. A is isomorphic to the algebra C 0 (X) of the continuous complex-valued functions on a compact
ω(AB) = ω(A) ω(B) for all A, B ∈ A, whence AB(ω) = ω(AB) = ω(A) ω(B) = A(ω)B(ω). And since A+B (ω) = ω(A+B) = ω(A) + ω(B) =Â(ω) +B(ω)
and A * (ω) = ω(A * ) = ω(A) * =Â * (ω), condition (C2) is satisfied. Furthermore, the Riesz Representation Theorem shows that states on C 0 (λ) are in oneone correspondence with Borel probability measures on Λ. Thus, for any state ϕ on a unital abelian C * -algebra A there is a Borel probability measure μ ϕ on Λ such that
When A is non-abelian it seems reasonable to continue to require (C2) for commuting elements of A. With 
Since a pure state on an abelian A is multiplicative and, thus, dispersion-free it follows from the previous section that any state on an abelian algebra can be represented as a mixture of dispersion-free states. Halvorson & Clifton (1999) prove a partial converse by showing that if a faithful state ϕ on a C * -algebra A can be represented as a mixture of dispersion-free states then A must be abelian. For our purposes, it is reasonable to restrict attention to faithful states because most physically significant states in QFT and QSM are faithful. Interpretations that falter with respect to faithful states are thus unacceptable, and those that succeed make a strong case for acceptance.
5.2.3
The MBA The results of the two preceding subsections encourage the idea that (a) relative to any state ϕ an abelian C * -algebra A counts as a beable algebra, and (b) if ϕ is a faithful state, or else A is a von Neumann algebra rich enough to describe Bell-EPR experiments and ϕ is a Bell-inequality-violating state, then in order for A to count as a beable algebra relative to ϕ it must be abelian. For here on we will ignore the qualifications in (b) and simply assume that for a von Neumann algebra to count as a beable algebra it must be abelian.
Having decided that a beable subalgebra R of a von Neumann algebra M is an abelian subalgebra, it is natural to look for a maximal abelian subalgebra. In implementing this strategy it is important to parse the relevant maximality as follows: R is abelian (i.e. R ⊆ R ; recall that ' ' denotes 'commutant'), and maximally so with respect to M (i.e. R ∩ M ⊆ R) with the upshot that R = R ∩ M. When M = B(H) (where H is the Hilbert space on which M acts) it is unreasonable to require that R is maximal with respect to B(H), i.e. R ⊆ R and, consequently, R = R . In any case such a beast may not exist, as follows from Lemma 1 A von Neumann algebra M acting on H contains an abelian subalgebra maximal with respect to B(H) iff M is abelian. 19 But if M is abelian then M is Type I. 20 On the other hand, any von Neumann algebra M contains abelian subalgebras that are maximal in M. 21 So with this understanding of maximality, the MBA to be described below can be applied to any von Neumann algebra.
Focusing on a maximal abelian subalgebra R ⊂ M and its dispersion-free states has an attractive semantic consequence. The projection lattice P (R) of an abelian R is a Boolean lattice, admitting two-valued homomorphisms, maps from P (R) to {0, 1} preserving the classical truth tables (see App. C and Bell & Machover 1977 for more on lattice theory). A dispersion-free state on R defines such a two-valued homomorphism, and conversely. Every self-adjoint element of R has a spectral resolution in P (R); thus a two-valued homomorphism on P (R) induces a map taking each self-adjoint element of R to one of its eigenvalues-a 'maximal set of observables with simultaneously determinate values' (Halvorson & Clifton 1999 , p. 2442 . It corresponds as well to a collection of determinate-value-attributing propositions that can receive truth valuations obedient to the classical truth tables.
We now have the ingredients for a scheme for casting not only quantum probabilities but also quantum semantics in a classical mold. We express the scheme succinctly:
Maximal-Beable Recipe Given a system whose algebra of observables is M and whose state is ϕ,
Step 1: Identify a maximal abelian subalgebra R of M.
Step 2: Characterize two-valued homomorphisms of P (R). Each corresponds to a possible configuration of the system. Step 3: Use ϕ to define a probability distribution over the homomorphisms identified in 2.
Step 2 of the recipe addresses what Sec. 2 called the problem of characterization while
Step 3 addresses the problem of explication. We will discuss how these steps are carried out for Type-I and Type-III algebras.
19 See Jauch 1960 and Jauch & Misra 1961. 20 This is because M and M are of the same type. Bear in mind that a Type-I algebra is not necessarily a Type-I factor or even a direct sum of Type-I factors.
21 Proof Note that the abelian subalgebras of any von Neumann algebra M are partially ordered by inclusion. Then apply Zorn's Lemma.
2
The MBA in Action: Type-I case There is a simple procedure for generating a maximal abelian subalgebra of B(H). One starts with a complete set {E i } of orthogonal one-dimensional projection operators-that is, atoms-in B(H) and one closes in the weak topology. The result will be an abelian von Neumann algebra including every self-adjoint element of B(H) that has {E i } as a spectral resolution (see Beltrametti & Cassinelli 1981, Sec. 3.2) . Call this the maximal abelian subalgebra of B(H) generated by {E i }. Familiar interpretations of ordinary QM can be seen as trafficking in maximal abelian subalgebras of B(H) so obtained. In collapse interpretations, the {E i } are eigenprojections of the observable measured. In modal interpretations, the {E i } are eigenprojections of the density operator W giving the state of the system. In 'Bohmian' interpretations, they are eigenprojections of the preferred determinate observable. In each case, the algebra generated is maximal abelian if and only if each E i is an atom. Each atom in a maximal abelian subalgebra R determines a two-valued homomorphism on its projection lattice P (R), 22 and thus an assignment of eigenvalues to self-adjoint elements of R. Such an eigenvaluation is, in Bub's (1997, p. 18 ) words, 'a maximal set of co-obtaining properties.' The atom defining a homomorphism determines (via the trace prescription) the probability a state W on B(H) assigns the eigenvaluation corresponding to that homomorphism. This atomic strategy solves the problems of characterization and explication while resurrecting a classical probability structure (the trace prescription restricted to P (R)) and a classical semantic structure (P (R) understood as a lattice of propositions) from the ashes of QM's assault on our time-honored intuitions.
The MBA in Action: Non-Type-I case Familiar variations on the MBA for ordinary QM use atoms in the projection lattice of B(H) to pick out a maximal beable subalgebra for a system in the state ϕ on B(H). These same atoms explicate the probabilities ϕ assigns possible value states of the system, according to the MBA: where E is the atom coding a value state, ϕ(E) gives the probability of that value state obtaining. A prima facie impediment to extending such interpretations to an arbitrary von Neumann algebra M is the possible absence from M of atoms; for if M lacks atoms then so does any abelian subalgebra of M that is maximal abelian with respect to M (that is, properly contained in no abelian subalgebra of M). 23 22 Where E is the atom, the homomorphism is h(F) = 1 if E < F; h(F) = 0 otherwise. If P (R) is finite, all its two-valued homomorphisms are determined in this way (Bell & Machover 1977, Cor. 5.3) . 23 Outline of proof: Suppose that M is atomless, and that R is a maximal abelian subalgebra with respect to M. Now suppose, for reductio, that E is an atom in P (R). Because M contains no minimal projections, there exists F ∈ M such that F < E. Because E is an atom in P (R), F / ∈ P(R), and hence F / ∈ R. But then R is not a maximal abelian subalgebra with respect to M, which is our contradiction. To see that R is not a maximal abelian subalgebra with respect to M, consider the algebra R ∪ F. Because F < E and E commutes with every element of P (R), F commutes with every element of P (R). Because P (R) generates R, it follows that F commutes with every element of R. So R ∪ F, But the impediment is only prima facie. Nothing in the maximal-beable recipe, above, requires us to specify maximal abelian subalgebras, code facts, or mediate probability assignments, by appeal to atoms. And in the Type-III case, we will have all the ingredients the recipe calls for. As already noted, any von Neumann algebra M contains abelian subalgebras that are maximal in M. This is all Step 1 of the recipe requires. Now if ω is dispersion-free on such a subalgebra R, then ω(A) ∈ Sp(A) for all self-adjoint A ∈ R. In particular, ω takes every element of the projection lattice P (R) to the spectrum {0, 1} characteristic of a projection operator. P (R) is a Boolean lattice on which ω thereby defines a two-valued homomorphism. This gets us, without the mediation of atoms, the existence of two-valued homomorphisms Step 2 of the recipe calls for. We also saw that any state ϕ on an abelian subalgebra R of an arbitrary M can be expressed as a mixture of dispersion-free states; hence, ϕ corresponds to a probability distribution over these homomorphisms, which is all Step 3 of the recipe calls for. Despite the proclivities of variations developed for ordinary QM, the MBA does not presuppose that R contains atoms.
However, while the nonatomic pursuit of the MBA is formally possible, it has its drawbacks. For one thing, mixtures of dispersion-free states on maximal abelian subalgebras of a Type-III (or -II) algebra are mixtures of non-normal states. This follows because (a) these subalgebras are atomless and, therefore, do not admit normal pure states and (b) for any von Neumann algebra, normal + dispersion-free implies pure. 24 Insofar as normal states are the physically realizable ones, this result threatens to undermine the interpretative strategy.
Perhaps the MBA can navigate this bump by observing that normality is a virtue states exhibit in exercising their capacity to assign probabilities; it is the virtue of assigning countably additive probabilities. But from the point of view of MBA the singular dispersion-free states ω appearing in the (MDFS) decomposition of a state ϕ (see Sec. 5.2.2) on an abelian R ⊂ M are not assigning probabilities; rather, they are defining two-valued homomorphisms on R. The singular states ω are also receiving (on behalf of those homomorphisms and the maximal patterns of beable instantiation they determine) probabilities from ϕ. Their non-normality need not hinder them in either of these roles.
Still, it prompts a question. What are the maximal patterns of beable instantiation coded by these singular dispersion-free states ω like? This is a fair question, for its answer is a solution to the problem of characterization. It is also a vexed which strictly contains R, is abelian.
24 Proof Let M be a von Neumann algebra and suppose ω is dispersion-free on its projection lattice P (M): for each projection E ∈ M, either ω(E) = 1 or ω(E) = 0. But then ω must be pure on P (M): if E is a projection operator and {0, 1} ω(E) = λω 1 (E) + (1−λ) ω 2 (E) for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, then either λ ∈ {0, 1} or ω 1 = ω 2 . Either way, ω is pure. Because ω is normal, its extension to M is determined by its action on P (M). Purity on the latter implies purity on the former. 2 question. To see why, we will consider an example of a dispersion-free state on an atomless maximal abelian von Neumann algebra. Let H be the separable Hilbert space L 2 (0, 1) of square integrable functions on the unit interval (0, 1) equipped with the Lebesgue measure. Where f is a bounded measurable function on (0, 1), let M f be the operator on L 2 corresponding to multiplication by f. The collection of such operators (with addition and multiplication defined pointwise) is a von Neumann algebra that is a maximal abelian subalgebra of B(H) (Kadison & Ringrose 1997b, Ex. 5.1.6 and p. 557). We will label it R Q because its projection operators are characteristic functions χ Δ for Borel subsets Δ of (0, 1), and we can think of such functions as eigenprojections of a position observable Q for a point particle confined to the unit interval. R Q has no minimal projection operators. (Intuitive argument: The only nonzero projection operators in R Q are characteristic functions χ Δ for sets Δ not of measure 0.
Because any measurable set has a measurable proper subset, no projection in R Q is minimal; see Kadison & Ringrose 1997b, Lem. 8.6.8.) 25 To investigate the character of dispersion-free states on R Q , we will exploit (without explicating) two important facts.
Fact 2 (Ultrafilters generate two-valued homomorphisms) Each ultrafilter of a Boolean lattice generates a two-valued homomorphism on that lattice.
Fact 3 (Ultrafilter Extension Theorem) Any subset S of a Boolean lattice possessing the finite-meet property-viz. that if x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ S then x 1 ∩ . . . ∩ x n = 0-is contained in some ultrafilter. (Bell & Machover 1977, Cor. 3.8) The proof of the Ultrafilter Extension Theorem invokes Zorn's Lemma, which is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice. Now consider a countable set F p ⊂ R Q of characteristic functions for (evershrinking) open neighborhoods around some p ∈ (0, 1). F p possesses the finitemeet property: for any finite family {χ 1 , χ 2 , . .
(The intersection is a lock to contain p, at least!) By defining a two-valued homomorphism on P (R Q ), an ultrafilter defines a dispersion-free state on R Q . It follows from the Ultrafilter Extension Theorem that there is a dispersion-free state ω p on R Q such that ω p (χ) = 1 for all χ ∈ F p .
Notice that ω p assigns 'located at p' probability 1. This seems as if it ought to be maximally specific information about the possible condition ω p codes. But it isn't. Even by the lights of the MBA, there are truths to be had that we don't know enough about ω p to get. For there are countably many distinct pure (thus dispersion-free) states on R Q that assign 'located at p' probability 1 (Halvorson 2001, Prop. 2) . Thus, for an arbitrary χ ∈ R Q , we don't know whether ω p (χ) = 1 or ω p (χ) = 0.
Contrast the pursuit of the MBA in the context of ordinary QM. Where R is a maximal abelian subalgebra of B(H), and E is an atom in R, the state ω E defined by ω E (A) := Tr(AE) for all A ∈ R is a dispersion-free state defining a two-valued homomorphism on the projection lattice P (R). For each F ∈ P(R), we know whether ω E (F) is 0 or 1. Knowing the truth value of each proposition we take to be determinately truth-valued, we know exactly what a world coded by E is like.
It is also illuminating to note the contrast with a dispersion-free state (q, p) of a classical system with phase space R 2 . Functions f : R 2 → R make up the beable algebra. For every element of this algebra, we can say what value the pure state (q, p) assigns it. Once again, the MBA sets terms for characterizing a possible world, which terms it is able to meet. In the presence of a nonatomic von Neumann algebra, this is not so. The problem is that we lack a constructive procedure for specifying a dispersion-free state on a nonatomic beable algebra. As Halvorson (2001, p. 41) aptly puts it, '[a]lthough we "know" that there are ultrafilters (i.e., pure states) [on such an algebra], we do not know this because someone has constructed an example.' We know it from a Zorn's Lemma argument.
The 'ineffability' of dispersion-free states on atomless P (R) suggests that we have no handle, analogous to the one supplied in the Type-I case by applying the eigenstate-eigenvalue link to an atom defining a dispersion-free state, on how to decode the facts these dispersion-free states encode. It suggests that we have no handle, analogous to the one supplied in the Type-I case by applying the trace prescription to the system state and a coding atom, on how to assign those facts probabilities. Confronted with the atomless von Neumann algebras of QFT and the thermodynamic limit of QSM, then, the MBA shirks two key interpretive tasks. First, it fails to explicitly characterize the recipients of quantum probability assignments. Judged by its own lights, it doesn't complete the task of lending content to the possible conditions of a quantum system. Second, it fails to explicate the probabilities the theory assigns. Thus the MBA fails to equip QFT and the thermodynamic limit of QSM with empirical content, in the form of specific probability assignments to explicitly characterized conditions possible for systems described by atomless von Neumann algebras. 26 Even if we can make our peace with this circumstance, a question remains: Without the help of atoms is there a motivated way to pick out a maximal abelian subalgebra? The next response to atomlessness we consider finds motivation by abandoning maximality.
Giving up on maximality
The idea here is not to be so greedy as to demand maximality; settle for finding a motivated way to pick out an abelian subalgebra R ⊂ M without demanding that R be maximal abelian in M. The modal interpretation as developed for ordinary QM is one implementation of this idea. As a first crude cut, the self-adjoint elements of the beable subalgebra of B(H) for a normal state ϕ corresponding to the density operator W are identified as those that share an eigenbasis with W or, equivalently, commute with W. Transferring this idea to a general von Neumann algebra M, the beable subalgebra for the state ϕ is the centralizer C ϕ (M) of ϕ as defined by 27 However, there is no guarantee that the subalgebra so identified will satisfy the characteristic touted above as essential to beables-namely, abelianness. To overcome this problem, take the beable subalgebra to be (2000) proved a beautiful result that homes in on Z C ϕ (M) as the abelian subalgebra of M that is maximal with respect to the property of being identifiable using only ϕ and algebraic operations within R. This prescription for picking out a (nonmaximal) abelian subalgebra leads to a dead end for many physically relevant states on Type-III algebras.
By the Tomita-Takesaki Theorem (see Kadison & Ringrose 1997b, Ch. 9 .2), a faithful normal state ϕ on a von Neumann algebra M has associated with it a unique automorphism group σ ϕ t (−∞ ≤ t ≤ +∞) with respect to which ϕ is a KMS state at inverse temperature −1. This theorem is fundamental for the development of QSM. However, the application we have in mind is not confined to QSM but applies quite generally. It proceeds via the following lemma: the centralizer C ϕ (M) of a faithful normal state ϕ coincides with the invariants I σ ϕ t (M) := A ∈ M : σ ϕ t (A) = A for all t ∈ R of the modular group (Kadison & Ringrose 1997b, p. 617) . For Type-III algebras and for a large class of faithful normal states on such algebras-e.g. ergodic states-I σ ϕ t (M) = CI. It follows that Z C ϕ (M) = CI, i.e. the modal beables are trivial. Trying to escape this no-go result by attacking Clifton's Characterization Theorem is to no avail if one agrees that any generalization of the modal interpretation to QFT and QSM must preserve the condition that, whatever other requirements the modally determinate observables for a state ϕ must satisfy, they must belong to the centralizer of ϕ. 
Mining for atoms
Clifton (2000) has criticized this maneuver as arbitrary. The choice of O is arbitrary; having chosen it, arbitrary too is the choice of interpolating Type-I factors. We would add that the status of the interpolating Type-I factors is somewhat mysterious. In the standard approaches to local QFT Minkowski space-time, the local von Neumann algebra M(O) associated with an open bounded region O with non-empty spacelike complement is a Type-III factor. The basic interpretational premise of these approaches is that elements of this algebra correspond to operations that can be performed locally in O. Supposing O is finite, every open bounded region that interpolates between it and O will therefore be associated with a Type-III factor algebra. The interpolating Type-I factor N is, therefore, the local algebra of no interpolating region. Although it can be mathematically associated with local space-time regions, the association lacks operational significance unless additional interpretational premises are introduced.
Conclusion
Interpretations of quantum probability have typically targeted the Type-I factor von Neumann algebras in whose terms the quantum theories most familiar to philosophers are formulated. But quantum physics makes use of von Neumann algebras of more exotic types, such as Type-III factors. Physics itself thus demands we extend our interpretation of quantum probability to these more exotic types. While significant features of the quantum probability formalism survive the extension, strategies for interpreting that formalism have not fared so well. State preparation is an exercise of our capacity to bring quantum systems into conditions that we can understand as assigning probabilities. Strategies adapted to Type-I von Neumann algebras for accounting for preparation exploit the presence in those algebras of filters. These strategies go extinct in the environment of Type-III factors, which lack filters. Strategies for prosecuting the MBA adapted to Type-I von Neumann algebras use atoms in the projection lattice of a von Neumann algebra M to specify a maximal abelian subalgebra R of M, to define homomorphisms on R's projection lattice, and to explicate the quantum probabilities a state ω on M assigns the eventualities coded by these homomorphisms. These strategies likewise go extinct in the environment of Type-III factor algebras, whose projection lattices are atomless. The MBA may be pursued nonatomically, because even an atomless M has maximal abelian subalgebras whose projection lattices admit homomorphisms over which an arbitrary state on M defines a probability measure. But the MBA adapted to the nonatomic case may not fare well in the struggle for interpretive existence. Without atoms, it is not clear how to make a principled selection of a maximal abelian subalgebra framing one's interpretation; even with such an algebra selected, its dispersion-free states are ineffable: by the MBA's own lights, there is more to say about a system whose condition is coded by such a state than we can at present constructively say. Clifton's modal interpretation of QFT gives up on maximality tout court. But the survival it thereby purchases is devoid of meaning for many physically significant states: applied to ergodic states, Clifton's QFT-adapted modal interpretation assigns determinate truth values only to tautologies and logical falsehoods. None of this is to say that in more exotic settings, quantum probabilities defy interpretation, even interpretation by adapting familiar strategies. We count what we have chronicled as resistance rather than defiance, resistance that invites further effort on the problem. sum of cyclic representations, the GNS-representations can be regarded as the fundamental ones. A basic result about GNS-representations is that the state ω is pure just in case π ω is irreducible. The von Neumann algebra associated with a representation π of A is π(A) := π(A) . Thus, if π is irreducible (as is the case with the GNS-representation induced by a pure state), π(A) = CI (because if there were some nontrivial subspace invariant under π(A), the projection operator for that subspace would belong to π(A) ), and π(A) = B(H).
A state ω on a von Neumann algebra M acting on H is normal just in case there is a density operator W on H such that ω(A) = Tr(WA) for all A ∈ M. Equivalently, a normal state is a completely additive state, i.e. ω ∑ α E α = ∑ α ω(E α ) for any set {E α } of pairwise orthogonal projectors in M. If M acts on a separable Hilbert space, countable additivity (i.e. the index α runs over a countable set) suffices for normality. A vector state ω for a von Neumann algebra M acting on H is a state such that there is a |ψ ∈ H where ω(A) = ψ|Aψ for all A ∈ M. Vector states are normal, but the converse is not true for all types of von Neumann algebras-it is true for Type III but false for Type I.
Appendix B: Type classification of factor von Neumann algebras
The range of a projection E in a von Neumann algebra M acting on a Hilbert space H is the linear span of |ψ ∈ H : E |ψ = |ψ . Thus the range of E is a closed subspace of H (cf. Kadison & Ringrose 1997a, Prop. 2.5.1). Two projections E and F in M are equivalent (written E ∼ F) just in case their ranges are isometrically embeddable into one another, by an isometry that is an element of M. Equivalence so construed is manifestly relative to M. When E's range is a subspace of F's range (written E ≤ F), E is a subprojection of F. Equivalent criteria are that FE = EF = E and that E |ψ ≤ F |ψ for all |ψ ∈ H. We use the subprojection relation to define the weaker than relation , which imposes a partial order on projections in a von Neumann algebra: E is weaker than F if and only if E is equivalent to a subprojection of F. Because is a partial order, E F and F E together imply that E ∼ F.
A projection E ∈ M is infinite if and only if there's some projection E 0 ∈ M such that E 0 < E and E ∼ E 0 . In this case, E 0 's range is both a proper subset of, and isometrically embeddable into, E's range. E ∈ M is finite if and only if it is not infinite. A nonzero projection E ∈ M is minimal if and only if E's only subprojections are 0 and E itself. It follows that minimal projections are finite. A general von Neumann algebra M need not be even a direct sum of factors. In the general case, the structural analogue of a minimal projection is an abelian projection. A nonzero projection E ∈ M is abelian if and only if the von Neumann algebra EME (in which E serves as the identity), acting on the Hilbert space EH, is abelian. We have minimal ⇒ abelian ⇒ finite, but in general the arrows cannot be reversed.
The Murray-von Neumann classification of von Neumann algebras applies in the first instance to factor algebras; on such algebras, the weaker-than relation imposes a total order (see Kadison & Ringrose 1997b, Prop. 6.2.6 
Appendix C: Lattices
The set P (M) of projection operators in the von Neumann algebra M is partially ordered by the relation ≤ of subspace inclusion. This partial order enables us to define for each pair of elements E, F ∈ P(M), their greatest lower bound (aka meet) E ∩ F as the projection whose range is the largest closed subspace of H that is contained in both E and F; and their least upper bound (aka join) E ∪ F as the projection whose range is the smallest closed subspace of H that contains both E and F. A lattice is a partially ordered set every pair of elements of which has both a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound. Thus the foregoing definitions render P (M) a lattice.
A lattice S has a zero element 0 such that 0 ≤ a for all a ∈ S and a unit element 1 such that a ≤ 1 for all a ∈ S. The zero operator (the projection operator for the null subspace) is the zero element of P (M) and the identity operator I is the unit element. The complement of an element a of a lattice S is an element a ∈ S such that a ∪ a = 1 and a ∩ a = 0. A lattice is complemented if each of its elements has a complement. It is orthocomplemented if these complements obey a = a and a ≤ b if and only if b ≤ a . P (M) is an orthocomplemented lattice, with the complement E ⊥ of E ∈ P(M) supplied by the range.
All a, b, c in a distributive lattice S satisfy the distributive laws
Notoriously, P (M) need not be distributive. But in the special case that M is abelian, P (M) is distributive. Indeed, it's a Boolean lattice (aka a Boolean algebra), that is, it is a distributive complemented lattice. The simplest Boolean lattice is the set {0, 1}, where each element is the other's complement, and meet and join correspond to set-theoretic intersection and union respectively. Call this lattice B 2 . Notice that B 2 's elements can be put into one-one correspondence with the truth values false (0) and true (1). A Boolean homomorphism between Boolean lattices B and B 2 is a map h : B →B 2 preserving the Boolean operations:
(N.B.: the second and third-equivalently the second and fourth-are sufficient to define a Boolean homomorphism; the remaining properties are consequences.) Construing B as a lattice of propositions, we can construe lattice operationsmeet (∩), join (∪), and complement ( )-as logical operations-disjunction (∨), conjunction (&), and negation (∼), respectively. Given this construal, a twovalued homomorphism h : B → B 2 on a Boolean lattice B is seen to be a truth valuation on B respecting the classical truth tables for disjunction, conjunction, and negation.
